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Background: Currently there are various issues that exist in the medical institutions
in China as a result of the price-setting in DRGs, which include the fact that medical
institutions tend to choose patients and that the payment standard for complex cases
cannot reasonably compensate the cost.
Objective: Themain objective is to prevent adverse selection problems in the operations
of a diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) system with the game pricing model for scientific
and reasonable pricing.
Methods: The study proposes an improved bargaining game model over three stages,
with the government and patients forming an alliance. The first stage assumes the alliance
is the pricemaker in the Stackelberg game tomaximize social welfare. Medical institutions
are a price taker and decide the level of quality of medical service to maximize their
revenue. A Stackelberg equilibrium solution is obtained. The second stage assumes
medical institutions dominate the Stackelberg game and set an optimal service quality for
maximizing their revenues. The alliance as the price taker decides the price to maximize
the social welfare. Another Stackelberg equilibrium solution is achieved. The final stage
establishes a Rubinstein bargaining game model to combine the Stackelberg equilibrium
solutions in the first and second stage. A new equilibrium between the alliance and
medical institutions is established.
Results: The results show that if the price elasticity of demand increases, the ratio of cost
compensation on medical institutions will increase, and the equilibrium price will increase.
The equilibrium price is associated with the coefficient of patients’ quality preference. The
absolute risk aversion coefficient of patients affects government compensation and total
social welfare.
Conclusion: In a DRGs system, considering the demand elasticity and the quality
preference of patients, medical service pricing can prevent an adverse selection problem.
In the future, we plan to generalize these models to DRGs pricing systems with the effects
of competition of medical institutions. In addition, we suggest considering the differential
compensation for general hospitals and community hospitals in a DRGs system, in order
to promote the goal of hierarchical diagnosis and treatment.
Keywords: bargaining model, pricing, government compensation, medical service, patient, quality
Duan et al. DRGs - Based Medical Service Pricing
INTRODUCTION
The National Health Commission and the other relevant
departments in China have started to test the diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs) system in 30 pilot locations since 2019.
DRGs refer to a price standardization mechanism based on
patients’ classification. Patients can be classified based on their
demographic and medical information, such as age, gender,
length in hospital, types of diseases, the severity of diseases
and comorbidity, complications, the necessity of surgery, etc
(1). DRGs aim to categorize patients who have similar clinical
features and medical resource consumption into the same
groups, which can standardize prospective payment to hospitals
or other medical institutions (2).
Currently there are various issues that exist in medical
institutions around the world as a result of the price-setting in
DRGs, which include the fact that medical institutions tend to
choose patients, the payment standard for complex cases cannot
reasonably compensate the cost, and medical service providers
increase the amount of outpatient services in order to reduce
hospitalization expenses (3). High price-setting in DRGs leads
to the difficulty of the government controlling medical expenses,
while low price-setting is not able to fairly compensate the costs
in medical institutions (1), and even leads to hospitals refusing
to accept patients in critical conditions. This conflict in price-
setting can be understood as a problem of adverse selection (4).
Therefore, it is imperative to explore an optimal pricing system
that helps to resolve the problem of adverse selection.
Many scholars apply the game theory to the pricing of
medical services, which solves the conflict of interests of the
stakeholders in the pricing of medical services (5–10). For
example, Weingarten (11) applies a generalized game theory
model to study the price-setting strategy of competitive medical
institutions. Westhoff et al. (5) and Agee et al. (8) apply
game theory to study cooperation and competition in disease
treatment payment and compensation. Nagurney (12) focus
on the supply chain of blood products in an asymmetric
information environment. Their study determines a generalized
Nash equilibrium model by adopting sharing constraints. This
model discusses the price-setting problem in the blood products
supply chain, which finds that participants nearer the termination
of the supply chain will have better access to information and
stronger bargaining power. However, most of these studies focus
on the linkages between price makers and medical institutions’
behavior, which ignore the impact on medical buyers’ behavior
and patient preferences with regard to medical service quality.
The present study thus aims to address the above issues
by providing some improvements in the game theoretical
model assumptions and the model design. First, the quality of
medical service is introduced as a variable in a medical service
pricing game model. Second, in China, medical institutions
are monopolistic in the provision of medical services, and
they are in a dominant position in the negotiation of price
and quality. Patients as individuals, their bargaining power is
scattered. Moreover, the lack of professional knowledge and
complete information also weaken patients’ bargaining power.
Therefore, it is necessary for the government, as the co-payer
of medical services, to balance the power of the supplier and
the purchasers.
We design a DRG pricing and compensation model as a
composite model of two Stackelberg games and bargaining
games. In the first round of the game, with the alliance of
government and patients as the leader of the game and the
medical institutions as the game follower, we get an equilibrium
solution about the price and quality of medical services. In the
second round of the game, with the medical institutions as the
leader of the game and the alliance of government and patients
as the follower of the game, we get another equilibrium solution
about the price and quality of medical services. In the third
round of the game, the two equilibrium solutions obtained above
are used as the initial solution of the bargaining game, and the
government and patients share the medical expenses.
RELATED WORKS
In the early days, scholars generally considered the
competitiveness of the medical service market and established a
game pricing model. The Shleifer pricing mechanism is a type
of yardstick regulation developed by Shleifer (13). They show
that the specific Nash equilibrium is the point where medical
institutions achieve optimal marginal cost. Ellis and McGuire
(14) explore an optimal neutral risk situation for medical
insurance paying to medical institutions. Allen and Gertler (15)
use game theory to study the influence of price-setting strategy
on patients’ satisfaction with services. Weingarten (11) applies
a generalized game theory model to study the price-setting
strategy of competitive medical institutions. Westhoff et al. (5)
and Agee et al. (8) apply game theory to study cooperation and
competition in disease treatment payment and compensation.
Robinson (16) adopt a Stackelberg game theory model in
discussing the relationship between cost transfer and payment
methods for medical institutions. They reveal a direct connection
between the cost-shifting and medical service payment policy,
which shows paying by classification of diseases is better than
paying by medical service items.
Many other scholars develop game models on price-setting
and negotiation by multiple participants in the medical services.
Most of these studies are based on information asymmetry
between participants (17, 18). Yaesoubi and Roberts (19) develop
a game model that considers two types of constraints. The
needed constraint is the bargaining powers of medical service
purchasers, and the soft constraint is the cost reimbursement
for service providers. These two types of constraints help the
model better determine the pricing in an information asymmetric
environment. De (20) adopts game theory to examine the
impact of information transactions on the relationship between
medical institutions and patients, and finds that there will be a
Nash equilibrium when patients can restrict medical suppliers’
induced demand.
In recent years, scholars have focused on the influence
of various factors, such as government intervention (21, 22),
medical service quality (17, 23–25), and payment mode of
medical services (26, 27), on the results of pricing games
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(2, 28–30). Behzad and Jacobson (31) investigate the impact
of government price intervention and duopoly competition
on medical price-setting. Their study applies the asymmetric
Bertrand-Edgeworthmodel to study this impact within a duopoly
market. A similar study developed by das Chagas Moura et
al. (32), who apply queue theory to improve the Stackelberg
game model, focuses on the problems of medical service pricing
and medical quality. Koenecke (33) analyses the non-extreme
equilibrium between two different payment methods in medical
insurance and medical institutions by applying a Stackelberg
game model. These two payment methods include a charge on
a per-service basis and a per-patient basis. Assuming medical
insurance can offer non-linear bonuses, the analysis shows
that charges on a per-patient basis can better contribute to
sharingmedical service information betweenmedical institutions
and patients.
THE NOVEL BARGAINING GAME MODEL
Model Assumptions
Assuming there are three players in the medical service
market, including the government, medical service suppliers, and
patients. Patients have only one treatment demand on each type
of disease and pay for a certain ratio of treatment fee to acquire
effective medical services. Medical institutions can solve patients’
queuing problems by having an appointment booking system.
As payers of medical service, the government and patients form
an alliance.
Assuming medical institutions have sufficient ability to fulfill
patients’ demands, the decision variable of the alliance is the
treatment price of each disease, and the objective function is
total social welfare. The decision variable of medical institutions
is medical service quality, and the objective function is the
profit of medical service. If assuming the demand function of a
medical service is a linear function of the medical service price
and quality, which is Q = a − bp + cq, where a, b, c ≥ 0,
b is the price elasticity of demand (PED) for a single type of
disease, c is the coefficient of patients’ preference on quality, and
p and q are decision variables. Moreover, the cost function of a
medical service is a function of the medical service quality, which
is C = F + 12γ q
2Q, where F is the fixed cost of medical service,
1
2γ q
2Q is themarginal cost, and γ is the coefficient of quality cost.
The objective function of the alliance is the social total surplus,


























The profit of medical institutions is





The bargaining game on disease treatment pricing will be
developed between the alliance and the medical institutions.
In the first stage, the alliance will be a price maker and
determine a pricing strategy for treatment based on social
welfare maximization. Medical institutions will the price taker to
determine a service quality strategy for responding to the price
strategy from the alliance. A Stackelberg equilibrium solution will
be achieved to balance the treatment price and service quality.
In the second stage, medical institutions will be the price maker
and determine an optimal service quality strategy for maximizing
their profits. While the alliance as the price taker will determine
another optimal treatment price strategy based on social welfare
maximization in response to the medical institutions’ strategy.
Another Stackelberg equilibrium solution will be achieved in this
stage to balance treatment price and service quality. These two
equilibrium solutions will be an initial solution for the bargaining
model between the alliance and medical institutions in the final
stage. The model will be in the Stackelberg game based on
the bargaining power of each player and it will achieve a final
Stackelberg bargaining equilibrium solution.
The First Round Stackelberg Game
The first stage is to apply the Stackelberg model to analyze the
pricing behavior by the alliance as a price maker. Based on social
total surplus maximization, the alliance can determine a price p1
for a certain medical treatment, and medical institutions as price
takers will determine a maximum profit on this certain treatment
which is q1 based on p1.
By applying the reverse acquisition, firstly, when maximizing
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(rb1p1 − ar)2 + 6c2rp1
3cr
(5)
Plugging (5) into (1), where the utility function maximization for


















γ b− 2a− 3
3b
(7)




(aγ − b)2 − 6c2
3ac
(8)
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Lemma 1. if and only if F ≥ b(a+γ
2)
ac−γ , there is an equilibrium
solution that exists for the pricing and quality Stackelberg
game model between the alliance and medical institutions, and










The ratio between the fixed cost and marginal cost in
medical institutions will be the minimum level of government
compensation, and it will be a positive relationship with PED.
In other words, when the PED of a certain disease treatment
increases, the ratio of cost compensation on medical institutions
will increase, and the treatment price will increase. Whereas,
when the ratio of cost compensation on medical institutions
decreases, the treatment price will decrease. This is the opposite
of Ramsey pricing because of the welfare in medical services.
When a type of disease belongs to the basic medical service, PED
decreases and the ratio of compensation on medical services will
decrease. While if a type of disease is not listed as a basic medical
service, such as rehabilitation, when PED increases, the ratio of
compensation on medical services will increase.
The Second Round Stackelberg Game
In this round of Stackelberg games, medical institutions are the
first decision-makers, and the government and patients’ alliance
are the followers. Based on the objective of profit maximization,
medical institutions will determine the decision variable q2 for
optimizing the service quality. The alliance then determines an
optimal price p2 for responding to the decision by the medical
institutions. By applying the reverse acquisition, a price for the
alliance can be obtained, which guarantees a maximized utility.






cq2 + a− 1
b
(9)
Plugging (9)into (3), based on ∂π
∂q2
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Lemma 2. if and only if
√
γ 2−aγ
4a < c <
√
γ 2+aγ
4a , there is an
equilibrium solution that exists in the Stackelberg game on the
pricing and quality for the alliance and medical institutions. This
















aγ − b+ 6γ 2
3a
If the coefficient of patients’ quality preference is in a certain
range, the equilibrium price of disease treatment will increase
with the increasing of the coefficient of patients’ quality
preference. Because the larger the coefficient of patients’ quality
preference, the more competitive medical service quality is, and
that is, if a medical institution slightly improves the quality of
medical services, it will lead to a large increase in the demand for
medical services. This will also lead to an increase in the market
share, which brings more profits to medical institutions. In this
regard, medical institutions normally set their treatment price
high. However, if the coefficient of patients’ quality preference
goes beyond a certain range, especially at a very high level,
the treatment price will no longer be the priority in patients’
consideration. To achieve effective treatment without waiting in
a queue will be the first thing considered by the patients. In
this situation, the treatment price will lose the ability to balance
market supply and demand. Opposite to this, if the coefficient of
patients’ quality preference is low, the service quality competition
among medical institutions will be ineffective. Patients are not
sensitive to the quality of medical services. If they feel that the
quality of medical services is the same, they will be sensitive
to the price. The market share of which medical institution is
cheap will be large. Therefore, medical institutions will adopt a
low-price strategy.
The alliance as the price maker in the Stackelberg game
determines a medical pricing strategy, medical institutions as
the price taker have to respond to the strategy and make
an optimal service quality strategy. The alliance has the first-
mover advantage. Whenmedical institutions are the price maker,
the alliance as the price taker has to respond by determining
an optimal medical pricing strategy. In this regard, medical
institutions have the first-mover advantage.
To satisfy the needs of the initial solution for the
bargaining model, the price level of unit quality for the






The Bargaining Game for Co-payment Medical
Expenses
A bargaining range (p∗1 , p
∗
2) made by the medical institutions and
the alliance is in a game. By applying the Rubinstein bargaining
model, an equilibrium solution is achieved




Where θ1, θ2 are the discount factors for the alliance andmedical
institutions, respectively. θ1 often depends on the patience level
of the alliance in negotiation, the opportunity cost of medical
treatment, and the severity of the diseases. θ2 depends on the
patience level of medical institutions in negotiation, difficulty of
patient referral, and the difficulty and risk of treatment.
Through the bargaining game between the alliance and
medical institutions, the medical service is priced for the alliance
as p. In this second game, the government and patients will
get in the game of sharing medical payments based on the
price p. The government and patients share the payment for the
medical service through a third-party payment mechanism, i.e.,
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health insurance. Paying through health insurance can easily put
patients into moral hazard, because patients may be insensitive
to medical prices and overspend on treatment. The early studies
by Arrow (34) and Zeckhauser (35) find that health insurance
should not fully cover all the medical cost. The effective payment
method is to set a reasonable co-payment ratio, which diversifies
the risks of patients and balances risks of patients’ moral hazard
and the profits of the insurance business. Ellis and Manning (36)
and Eeckhoudt (37) state that the marginal profit achieved from
the risk diversification by insurance equals their marginal cost
in moral hazard; the health insurance co-payment ratio is the
optima. Blomqvist (38) discusses the optimal design of health
insurance co-payment ratio in a non-linear model and finds
that the optimal health insurance co-payment ratio depends on
patients’ health level.
The medical pricing bargaining model was developed in the
first stage by the alliance and medical institutions, which aims to
prevent moral hazard caused by patient’s excessive consumption
of medical care. The medical treatment co-payment ratio game
model developed in the second stage aims to prevent the
overtreatment risk caused by the third-party payment system.
Based on the result in the first stage, by adding the co-payment
ratio λ, the demand of medical function will be D = a − bλp,
which refers to a linear function of patients’ medical demand,
where a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
Patients’ moral hazard in health insurance can cause waste
in social welfare. Therefore, this study considers that the
optimal co-payment rate is if and only if the social welfare
loss caused by medical insurance is minimized. Three parts of
health insurance may cause a loss in social welfare. The first
part is the deadweight loss caused by patients’ moral hazard.
Based on Arrow’s study, the deadweight loss caused by patients’
moral hazard is (1−λ)
2b2 . The second part is the government’s
expectation of opportunity cost on its medical support. This can




p̄. The third part is the cost
of risk prevention, which is presented as Rλ
2σ 22 , where δ is the
incidence of diseases, R is the coefficient of patients’ absolute risk
aversion, and σ 2 is the variance of the medical treatment price.









By deriving (12), it will achieve
∂WL
∂λ
= −(1− λ)b− bδp̄(1− λ)− δp̄(a− bλ)+ Rλσ 2 = 0
(13)
Solving (13) will achieve
λ∗ =
b+ δp̄(a+ b)
b+ 2bδp̄+ Rσ 2
(14)
Lemma 3. if and only if R ≥ σ
2b+ 12 aδ
δ2a
, the loss of total social
welfare decreases, then increases with the increase of social health
insurance co-payment ratio. If R <
σ 2b+ 12 aδ
δ2a
, the loss of total
social welfare decreases with the increase of social health insurance
co-payment ratio.
The coefficient of patients’ absolute risk aversion stands for
the ability of patients to predict the incidence and loss caused
by diseases. If the coefficient is lower than a certain threshold
value, an increase in the social medical insurance co-payment
ratio will bring about a reduction in the total social welfare
loss, which is an increase in the total social welfare. In contrast,
if the coefficient is higher than the certain threshold value,
the increase of social health insurance co-payment ratio will
reduce the loss of total social welfare first and then increase,
which means that the total social welfare first increases and
then decreases.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The above section presents the bargaining game model on
pricing and government compensation between the government,
patients, and medical institutions. In the first stage, the alliance
formed by the government and patients leads the price as the
price maker. The alliance will determine a pricing strategy bases
on social welfare maximization. Medical institutions as price
takers will make a service quality strategy in response to the
pricing strategy from the alliance. This will form a Stackelberg
equilibrium solution between prices of disease treatment and
medical service quality.
In the second stage, medical institutions will be the
price maker in the game. Based on profit maximization,
medical institutions will create an optimal service strategy for
providing the highest level of medical quality. While based
on the social welfare maximization, the alliance will be the
price taker, to make an optimal disease treatment price in
response to the optimal service strategy made by the medical
institutions. This will create another Stackelberg equilibrium
solution between prices of disease treatment and medical
service quality.
Taking these two equilibrium solutions as the initial solution
for the bargaining game between the alliance and medical
institutions, and based on the bargaining power of the alliance
and medical institutions, we can achieve an equilibrium price of
Rubenstein’s bargaining game through developing Rubenstein’s
game. In the final stage, based on theminimization of deadweight
social loss, the government and patients will share the payment
of medical costs. To analyze PED on diseases, the coefficient of
patients’ preferences on service quality, the coefficient of patients’
absolute risk aversion, and the relationship between disease
pricing and government compensation, this study provides
several specific values to simulate a series of impacts on the
equilibrium price. Firstly, the study analyzes the PED on the
equilibrium price. It assumes that the coefficient of the demand
function a = 0.3, the coefficient of disease treatment quality cost
γ = 10, and the coefficient of patients’ preferences on treatment
quality c = 0.6. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the
equilibrium price and disease PED.
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FIGURE 1 | Price and PED.
The relationship presented in Figure 1 is in a scenario where
the optimal pricing strategy made by the alliance as a price maker
will call for medical institutions to respond with their service
quality strategy. It is a positive correlation between the treatment
equilibrium price and disease treatment PED, i.e., the higher
the PED in the treatment of the disease, the higher the price of
the treatment. This is the opposite of Ramsey pricing. Medical
services can be categorized as basic medical services and special
medical services. The PED of basic medical services is low, and
it is largely for non-profit-making purposes. In this regard, the
pricing for this type of medication will be low. While special
medical services have more significant commodity attributes and
their high PED value leads the pricing to be higher than that of
basic medical services.
To analyze the relationship between the treatment pricing
and the coefficient of patients’ service quality preference, it is
necessary to set the elasticity of treatment demand b = 0.3, the
parameter o‘f the demand function a = 0.3, and the coefficient of
treatment quality cost γ = 10.
Figure 2 shows a scenario that reflects the relationship
between the equilibrium price of diseases and the coefficient of
patients’ quality preferences. In this scenario, medical institutions
act as price makers. Based on the objective of maximizing profit,
their priority is to optimize disease quality control decisions.
Furthermore, the alliance of government and patients as the price
taker will make the optimal price decision according to the goal of
maximizing social welfare. In this model, when the coefficient of
patients’ quality preferences can be controlled in a certain range,
the relationship between disease equilibrium price and patients’
quality preference can be positive, i.e., the higher the coefficient
of patients’ quality preference, the more disease equilibrium price
increases, and vice versa.
The curveWF1 in Figure 3 shows that the total social welfare
increases first and then decreases with the increase of social
medical insurance co-payment ratio, where the patients’ absolute
risk aversion coefficient is R ≥ σ
2b+ 12 aδ
δ2a
. The curveWF2 presents
another scenario in which the patients’ absolute risk aversion
coefficient is R <
σ 2b+ 12 aδ
δ2a
and the total social welfare increases
with the increase of social insurance co-payment ratio.
The above scenarios reflect the patient’s risk aversion
attitude toward health threats. When patients have a higher
absolute risk aversion coefficient, they will experience more
FIGURE 2 | Price and preference.
FIGURE 3 | Welfare and co-payment ratio.
medical moral hazard, and when the co-payment rate of
social insurance increases to a certain extent, it will lead to
a loss on total social welfare. Opposite to this, when patients’
absolute risk aversion coefficient reduces, their medical moral
hazard decreases. This can lead to a continuous increase in
the total social welfare while the social insurance co-payment
ratio increases.
CONCLUSION
In the process of DRGs operation in many countries, especially
in developing countries, such as India and China, unreasonable
pricing and government compensation of medical services
under the DRGs operation environment will lead to two major
problems. On the one hand, underpricing will lead to medical
institutions shirking the responsibility of critically ill patients
and decomposing the DRGs category; on the other hand,
overpricing will lead to a sharp increase in or even out of control
medical expenses. To balance the interests of the government,
patients, and medical institutions, the improved bargaining
game model based on the Stackelberg game is introduced in
order to balance this system and improve the total utility level
of society.
The game pricing model developed in this study considers the
relationship among the three roles including the government,
medical institutions, and patients. The interests and behaviors
of these roles have been studied through the models which
present a suggestion on price negotiation and setting to the
government and medical institutions, and the conducted result
can guide medical institutions with a better price-setting strategy.
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The model also classifies price-setting according to the price
elasticity of demand formedical services. To bemore realistic, the
study has considered price-setting under the impact of patients’
preferences for medical service quality. As a result, we find
that the absolute risk aversion coefficient of patients affects the
relationship between the co-payment rate of medical expenses
and total social welfare. In addition, with more investment in
public health education, the government can control the moral
risk of over-treatment of patients during the operation of DRGs
by influencing the absolute risk aversion coefficient of patients
and limiting the absolute risk aversion coefficient of patients in
a certain range. The future of this study is to generalize these
models to DRGs pricing systems with the effects of competition
of medical institutions, including considering differences in
the compensation of DRGs systems between infirmaries and
hospitals, in order to promote the goal of hierarchical diagnosis
and treatment.
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